Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) allows one user to delegate the decryption rights of his/her ciphertexts to another user. Since the introduction of Multi-Hop Identity-Based PRE (MH-IBPRE) by Green and Ateniese, the ciphertext size and the decryption complexity grow linearly in the number of re-encryption "hops". In this paper, for the first time, we propose an MH-IBPRE that maintains the (constant) ciphertext size and computational complexity regardless of the number of re-encryption hops. Moreover, our scheme is bidirectional and also supports conditional re-encryption. The scheme is proven secure against selective identity and chosen-ciphertext attacks and collusion resistant in the standard model. As of independent interest, we also show that the conditional re-encryption can also be extended to a set of conditions.
Introduction
Public Key Encryption (PKE) is a useful cryptographic primitive, whereby it allows a user to encrypt data under the public key of a receiver such that only the legitimate receiver with the corresponding private key can access the data. In social networks, a data is often shared among different users. A user, say Alice, can share a data, e.g., a picture or video with her friend, say Bob, without loss of confidentiality by using the traditional PKE. Sometimes, Bob might choose to further share the same data with another user, say Carol. In the context of PKE, Bob should first decrypt the ciphertext of the data sent by Alice, and next re-encrypt the data to Carol so as to finish data sharing. This, nevertheless, does not scale well when Bob is off-line or unavailable. An alternative way is that Bob delegates a proxy to encrypt the data to Carol when he is absent. However, this kind of delegation relies on either the accessibility of the data or knowledge of Bob's private key in the view of proxy.
To increase the flexibility of data sharing in the context of PKE, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [3] defined the notion of Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE), in which a semi-trusted proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext intended for Alice into another ciphertext of the same plaintext intended for Bob using a given re-encryption key without accessing the underlying plaintext. If the re-encryption key allows the proxy to transform ciphertexts intended for Alice (i.e. delegator) to ciphertexts intended for Bob (i.e. delegatee) and vice versa, the scheme is bidirectional. Whereas, if the re-encryption key only supports 2. In the security notion, this paper proposes the game-based definition of selective condition and selective identity and adaptive chosen-ciphertext (IND-sCon-sID-CCA) security, in which an adversary is restricted to output the challenge condition and the challenge identity before seeing the public parameters. Meanwhile, this paper proposes the definition of collusion resistance for BiMH-IBCPRE, in which the proxy cannot compromise the entire private key of the delegator even colluding with the corresponding delegatee.
• This paper, for the first time, proposes a BiMH-IBCPRE scheme to tackle the open problems left by the existing MH-IBPRE schemes. The proposed scheme is a type of MH-IBPRE, but additionally captures bidirectional, conditional re-encryption, constant decryption complexity and constant-size ciphertext properties. Note there are subtleties in combining bidirectional property, conditional re-encryption with MH-IBPRE to achieve a secure scheme, therefore our construction is not trivial. The paper also presents an extension of the new scheme which can support conditional re-encryption with a set of conditions.
• Our scheme can be proved IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure and collusion resistant in the standard model under the decisional 3-weak bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption. It is the first bidirectional PRE (in general) achieving collusion resistance.
• When compared with all existing MH-IBPRE schemes constructed in the standard model, our scheme achieves better performance in efficiency, and offers fine-grained decryption rights delegation to delegator without degrading security level.
Paper organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the related work and the difficulty of achieving collusion resistance in bidirectional setting. In Section 3, we give the definitions and security models for BiMH-IBCPRE. In Section 4, we introduce some basic knowledge of bilinear map, complexity assumption, one-time signature and pseudorandom function family that will be used throughout the paper. In Section 5, we propose our basic BiMH-IBCPRE scheme in the standard model, and meanwhile, give the corresponding security proof. In Section 6, we give an efficient extension of our basic scheme. In Section 7, we compare our scheme with some well-known MH-IBPRE systems. In Section 8, we explore the applications of BiMH-IBCPRE. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper. Appendix A presents the security proof of our basic scheme.
Related work
Following the concept of decryption rights delegation introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [22] , Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [3] formalized the notion of PRE, and proposed a seminal bidirectional PRE scheme with CPA security. In 2003, Ivan and Dodis [18] proposed formal definitions of the bidirectional and unidirectional proxy functions, and implemented the functions based on cryptographic primitives such as IBE. Later on, Ateniese et al. [1] proposed three CPA-secure unidirectional PRE schemes and demonstrated some practical applications for PRE. After that, many well-known unidirectional PRE schemes (e.g., [15, 20, 35, 16, 17] ) have been proposed.
In 2007, Canetti and Hohenberger [7] defined the CCA security model for PRE, and proposed two CCA-secure bidirectional multi-hop PRE schemes with constant-size ciphertexts: one is constructed in the random oracle model, and the other is built in the standard model. Later on, Deng et al. [11] constructed a CCA-secure bidirectional single-hop PRE scheme in the random oracle model. In 2010, Matsuda, Nishimaki and Tanaka [23] proposed a bidirectional multi-hop PRE scheme that has been pointed out to be not CCA secure by Weng, Zhao and Hanaoka [36] . The aforementioned bidirectional PRE schemes, however, suffer from collusion attacks where a dishonest proxy can compromise the entire private key of the delegator by colluding with the corresponding delegatee. Therefore, how to be collusion resistant in the bidirectional setting remains elusive.
To employ PRE in the context of IBE (i.e. supporting identity-based re-encryption), Green and Ateniese [14] defined the notion of IBPRE and proposed two concrete constructions in the random oracle model: one is CCA-secure unidirectional single-hop, and the other is unidirectional multi-hop with CPA security. Later on, Tang, Hartel and Jonker [29] proposed a CPA-secure IBPRE scheme with random oracles, in which the delegator and the delegatee can belong to different domains. The previous schemes, however, are not collusion resistant. To hold against collusion attacks, the following unidirectional single-hop IBPRE schemes are proposed. Two CPA-secure IBPRE schemes without random oracles were proposed by Matsuo [24] . In 2010, Wang et al. [31, 32] proposed two IBPRE schemes in the random oracle model: one is CPA-secure supporting the revocability of proxy's re-encryption rights, and the other is CCA-secure allowing the proxy to be malicious (rather than being semi-trusted). In 2011, Mizuno and Doi [25] constructed an IBPRE scheme in the standard model with CPA security based on Waters IBE [33] and an ElGamal-type PKE scheme. Later, two CPA-secure IBPRE schemes without random oracles were proposed by Luo, Shen and Chen [21] : one is single-hop and the other is multi-hop. Recently, Liang et al. [19] proposed the first CCA-secure unidirectional single-hop IBPRE in the standard model supporting conditional reencryption. The scheme can be regarded as the combination of IBPRE and conditional PRE. Note that conditional PRE will be further introduced later. 
In [14] , Green and Ateniese left the construction of a CCA-secure unidirectional MH-IBPRE as an open problem. To solve the problem, Chu and Tzeng [9] proposed an MH-IBPRE scheme without random oracles which is secure against replayable chosen-ciphertext attacks (RCCA) [8] . In 2010, Wang et al. [30] proposed the first CCA-secure MH-IBPRE with random oracles. Nevertheless, these schemes all suffer from collusion attacks. Recently, Shao and Cao [27] proposed a generic construction for CCA-secure unidirectional MH-IBPRE in the standard model, and meanwhile presented a concrete construction based on a fully secure IBE scheme [34] . The construction, however, has to depend on a hierarchical IBE that is IND-aID-CCA secure. Previously introduced MH-IBPRE schemes incur high communicational and computational complexity as the size of ciphertext and the decryption cost grow linearly in the number of re-encryption hops. This paper focuses on solving such a problem.
The above mentioned PREs (in general) cannot support fine-grained control on re-encryption such that the proxy can re-encrypt all ciphertexts of delegator to delegatee without any discrimination [37] . To address the problem in traditional PRE setting, Type-Based PRE (TBPRE) [28] and Conditional PRE (CPRE) [38] were proposed, in which the proxy can re-encrypt a ciphertext tagged with a condition if and only if the re-encryption key corresponding to the same condition is given by the delegator. In 2009, Weng et al. [37] proposed a new CPRE scheme by re-formalizing the definitions and security notions, and pointed out the secure risk of [38] . To hide the condition from proxy, Fang, Susilo and Wang [12] proposed a CCA-secure CPRE with condition anonymity in the standard model. Despite there are a few PRE schemes supporting conditional re-encryption property, how to achieve this property in the MH-IBPRE setting remains open. This paper also deals with the problem.
Difficulty of being secure against collusion attacks in bidirectional setting. In traditional PRE with bidirectional property, such as [7, 11] , the re-encryption key algorithm takes the private keys of delegator and delegatee as input, and outputs a re-encryption key, denoted as rekey. Due to the construction of rekey (e.g., rekey = x/ y, x and y are the private keys of delegator and delegatee), the proxy can compromise the private key of the delegator by colluding with the delegatee. Thus, how to hold against collusion attacks in the bidirectional setting that remains open.
Intuitively, one might think that by using a random value, e.g., a β, to randomize the delegator's private key such that rekey = (β · x)/ y, the problem can be solved. However, this is an undesirable approach. We use Canetti and Hohenberger's bidirectional PRE scheme (the one with random oracles) [7] as an example to give a specific explanation. Note that for convenience we only analyze the components of ciphertext to be participated into re-encryption and decryption. In [7] , the components of an original ciphertext are A = svk, B = pk r , C = e(g, H(svk)) r · m, where pk = g It is clear that the delegatee (with knowledge of y) cannot recover the plaintext without knowledge of β. Hence, when generating rekey the delegator might choose to encrypt β under the public key of the delegatee such that the delegatee can recover m. If so, the bidirectional property cannot be maintained any more as rekey = ((β · x)/ y, Enc(pk y , β)) is only applicable to the re-encryption from the delegator to the delegatee but not the inverse case. In addition, by colluding with the delegatee, the proxy still can compromise x with knowledge of y and β.
Alternatively, the delegator might hide β from the proxy and the delegatee by letting it be an exponent of its public key, that is, pk = g β·x (sk = x). Here B will become B = (g β·x ) r . Then the proxy will output B = B y/(β·x) = (g (β·x)r ) y/(β·x) = g ry such that the delegatee can recover m with y. It seems that the bidirectional property and collusion resistance can be obtained simultaneously as the proxy is only able to compromise β · x rather than x by collusion. This approach, however, comes at a price that the size of public key is linear in the number of re-encryption keys. For example, if there are N distinct re-encryption keys of a user to be uploaded to the proxy, then the user has to generate N corresponding public keys. Therefore, the above approach does not scale well in practice. We compare our scheme with four multi-hop PRE schemes in terms of functionality and security in Table 1 . Despite identity-based re-encryption, conditional re-encryption, collusion resistance and constant size ciphertext properties have all four been partially achieved by existing schemes, there is no efficient CCA-secure proposal that achieves the properties simultaneously in the standard model. This paper is the first to achieve the goal. For simplicity, we omit mpk in the expression of the algorithms input in the rest of the paper.
Definition and security models

Definition of BiMH-IBCPRE
Correctness:
For any security parameter λ ∈ N, any n ∈ N, any identities 3 ). Note that given rk i→ j|W (resp. rk j→i|W ) the proxy can fulfill a bidirectional re-encryption between two distinct identities ID i and ID j under a set W of conditions with the help of algorithm ReKeyBiGen.
Security models
In this section we concentrate on formulating the security notion for BiMH-IBCPRE including IND-sCon-sID-CCA security and collusion resistance. Before proceeding, we define the notations that to be used in the definition as follows.
• Delegation chain. Suppose in a BiMH-IBCPRE scheme there is a re-encryption key set RK = {rk i 1 →i 2 |W , ..., • Uncorrupted/corrupted identity. If the private key of an identity is compromised by an adversary, then the identity is considered as a corrupted identity. Otherwise, the identity is an uncorrupted identity.
• 
tity or ID j is in a corrupted delegation chain. 4 As of [7] , a derivative of (ID
If A has issued a re-encryption key query on (ID i , ID j , W ) to obtain rk i→ j|W , and achieved
The advantage of A is defined as 1 
|. 4 Namely, ID * is in a corrupted delegation chain under W * after re-encryption.
Remarks. When W = null, the model above is for BiMH-IBPRE. The model will become IND-sCon-sID-CPA if A cannot query O re and O dec .
Usually a traditional PRE has two types of security notion: one is for the original ciphertext security, and the other is for the re-encrypted ciphertext security (which usually implies collusion resistance). From our security model, it can be seen that we only define the first type of security notion, i.e. the security of original ciphertext (as the challenge is an original ciphertext). We state that the security model already implies the security for re-encrypted ciphertext in the BiMH-IBCPRE setting with a limitation that the challenge identity must be in an uncorrupted delegation chain under the challenge condition. 5 The above statement is valid because of the bidirectional and multi-hop properties of a BiMH-IBCPRE. (W , j) . This can be seen in our construction (please refer to Section 5).
Note that a stronger security notion, i.e. allowing A to issue the partial re-encryption key queries, can be extended from our model by giving A an additional oracle O prk which takes an identity ID and a condition set W as input and outputs a partial re-encryption key. Nevertheless, O prk must follow a restriction where if an identity ID is in a delegation chain under W * containing the challenge identity ID * , then the oracle outputs ⊥. This is necessary because if such a partial re-encryption key is given, A can generate a re-encryption key from ID to a corrupted identity such that ID * is in a corrupted delegation chain under W * . This contradicts our IND-sCon-sID-CCA game.
We next proceed to the definition of collusion resistance. Since the security model defined in Definition 2 is based on the selective model (i.e. sCon-sID), we define the collusion resistance for BiMH-IBCPRE below in the selective model as well.
Definition 3. A BiMH-IBCPRE scheme is collusion resistant if the advantage Adv
where λ is the security parameter, ID * and W * are the challenge identity and the challenge condition set, Ω is the valid private key space, O sk and O rk are the oracles defined in Definition 2, but there is no constraint for querying them except for O sk (ID * ).
Below we show that the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security already implies collusion resistance.
Theorem 1. If a BiMH-IBCPRE scheme achieves IND-sCon-sID-CCA security as defined in Definition 2, it also achieves collusion resistance.
Proof. In the game of Definition 2, an adversary A is allowed to access the re-encryption keys rk i 
by using sk ID j so as to know the value of the bit b. Accordingly, the security of IND-sCon-sID-CCA fails that contradicts our security notion.
Therefore, the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security implies collusion resistance.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 2
Preliminaries
Below we review negligible function, bilinear maps and the complexity assumption used in our security proof, and next introduce strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature and the pseudorandom function family.
Negligible function
A function φ(n) : N → R is negligible in n if 1/φ(n) is a non-polynomially-bounded quantity in n.
Bilinear maps
Let BSetup be an algorithm that on input the security parameter λ, outputs the parameters of a bilinear map as  (q, g, G 1 , G T , e) , where G 1 and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, where |q| = λ, and g is a random generator of G 1 . The mapping e :
(2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1 G T , where 1 G T is the unit of G T ; (3) Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
The decisional l-th weak bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption
, where h is a generator of G 1 and α ∈ Z * q . Define
of an adversary A in winning the decisional l-wBDHI * problem. We say that the decisional l-wBDHI * assumption [4] holds in G 1 if no PPT A has non-negligible advantage.
Strongly existential unforgeable one-time signatures
A strongly existential unforgeable one-time signature (OTS) [2] consists of the following algorithms:
on input a security parameter λ ∈ N, the algorithm outputs a signing/verification key pair 
where State is the state information.
Pseudorandom function family
Let PRF : K × D → R be a pseudorandom function family [13] , and G : D → R be a truly random function family, where K is the set of function keys, D and R are the domain and range, respectively. In short, we use PRF k (m) to represent PRF(k, m). The advantage of a PPT adversary A in attacking the pseudorandomness of PRF is defined as:
where λ is a security parameter. If Adv PRF A (1 λ ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A in attacking the pseudorandomness of the function family PRF, then PRF is a pseudorandom function family.
A CCA-secure BiMH-IBCPRE scheme
In this section we first briefly introduce the roadmap of our construction, and then propose a concrete construction for CCA-secure BiMH-IBCPRE in the standard model. Meanwhile, we present the security proof right after the construction.
Basic construction
Construction intuition. The scheme is constructed based on a Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [4] , a pseudorandom function [13] , and a one-time signature scheme [2] . Our technical roadmap is different from that of [14, 9, 27] . In [14] , Green and Ateniese began with Boneh and Franklin IBE [6] and next extended the IBE to a CPA-secure MH-IBPRE in the random oracle model. Chu and Tzeng [9] used the CHK transformation [5] to convert Waters IBE [33] to a CCAsecure 2-level IBE scheme, and then extended it to an RCCA-secure MH-IBPRE in the standard model. In [27] , a CCA-secure MH-IBPRE without random oracles is built on top of a strongly CPA-secure HIBE scheme [34] . Note that [14, 9, 27] are constructed in the unidirectional setting.
However, we start with a 3-level HIBE scheme [4] such that an identity of a message receiver, a condition set associated with the message and a verification key can be respectively assigned to different level upon encrypting the message, and further extend the scheme to be secure against CCA by leveraging the CHK transformation. We next employ the technology of CPRE and a pseudorandom function in the CCA-secure 3-level HIBE scheme so as to propose an IBPRE with conditional re-encryption (i.e. CCA-secure IBCPRE). The usage of pseudorandom function is to guarantee the validity of re-encryption such that once the re-encryption result is mutated by an adversary, the mutation can be told. Note we will give more details in the security proof of our construction.
Furthermore, we adapt the CCA-secure IBCPRE to achieve the bidirectional property (i.e. CCA-secure Bi-IBCPRE) by revising the construction of re-encryption key. We allow a proxy to use a re-encryption key to partially "decrypt" an original ciphertext such that the delegatee can recover the plaintext by using his/her private key. The most subtle part is the generation of re-encryption key. The re-encryption key generation takes the private keys of a delegator and a delegatee as input. To preclude the proxy from accessing the underlying plaintext, we first use random factors to mask the private keys to become random elements, and next leverage the elements to construct the re-encryption key. Intuitively, these random elements will also mask the re-encryption result such that the delegatee cannot recover the plaintext unless he/she has knowledge of them (e.g., the elements are encrypted intended for the delegatee). But if the delegatee knows the random elements, then the proxy can easily compromise the entire private key of the delegator by colluding with the delegatee. Accordingly, the system cannot hold against collusion attacks. To address the problem, we make use of the property of bilinear pairing in the sense that we leverage random factors (which are unknown to both the proxy and the delegatee) to hide the private keys' components but these factors will be eliminated eventually in re-encryption phase.
Due to our re-encryption key generation technique, the re-encryption algorithm will always yield constant-size reencrypted ciphertext no matter how many re-encryption hops have been traversed. This is so because there is no need to construct additional encryption for random factors in re-encryption key generation phase any more. Thus it is not difficult for us to extend the above resulting scheme to support multi-hop re-encryption.
Here we propose our basic construction for BiMH-IBCPRE where a ciphertext is only tagged with a single condition w, and in the next section (i.e. Section 6), we further extend the basic scheme to support multiple conditions which are denoted as a condition set W = {w z | 1 ≤ z ≤ n, w z ∈ Z * q }. Denote by [M] λ 1 −λ the first λ 1 − λ bits of bit-string M, and [M] λ the last λ bits of bit-string M. Below is the description of our construction. Setup(1 λ , n) . Given the security parameter λ and n the allowable maximum number of conditions in the sys-
1.
and prepare a pseudorandom function PRF : G T × G 1 → {0, 1} λ 1 (which takes an element in G T as the function key and an element in G 1 as input, and outputs a λ 1 -bit pseudorandom string), where λ 1 is a security parameter as well. Let w ∈ Z * q be a condition, (Sign.KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be an OTS scheme, and assume the verification key output by Sign.KeyGen(1 λ ) is in Z * q . The master secret key is msk = g α 2 , and the master public key is mpk KeyGen(msk, ID) . Given the master secret key msk and an identity ID (i.e. an identity I = (ID)), choose r ∈ R Z * q , and output the key
A system user with knowledge of sk ID can generate the following private key due to the key derivation of HIBE [4] .
where r = r + t. 3. Enc(ID i , w, m) . Given an identity ID i , a condition w and a message m, choose an OTS key pair (
and output the first-level ciphertext
ID j then sends the partial re-encryption key , C (ID i ,w) ). Given a re-encryption key rk i→ j|w and a ciphertext C (ID i ,w) , the re-encryption algorithm works as follows. (a) Verify the validity of the ciphertext:
= e(g, C 4 ),
If Eq. (1) does not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise, proceed.
, output the re-encrypted ciphertext
2 is from the first-level ciphertext. 
, and then verify
Remarks. We assume there is a secure channel (such as SSL) between the delegator and the delegatee in the re-encryption key generation protocol. In addition, like [4] , we can use a target collision resistant hash function [10] : H : {0, 1} * → Z * q to hash each condition w, identity ID and verification key K v beforehand such that we can extend our scheme to handle arbitrary-length condition, identity and verification key.
Correctness:
s . With knowledge of private key sk
the original receiver can compute
= σ .
• When l ≥ 2, suppose there is a delegation chain under w between ID i and ID j , i.e. (w,
. . .
where l = j. With knowledge of private key
Security analysis
Below we prove our BiMH-IBCPRE scheme IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure in the standard model.
Informally, we state that our scheme is secure against CCA. Suppose there is an adversary A that follows the constraints 6 the value of the bit b remains hidden to A. This is so because the verification key C * 0 and the signature C *
6
(as well as ID * and w * ) are independent of b, C * 2 , C * 3 , C * 4 , C * 5 can be regarded as the ciphertext of a 3-level BBG HIBE scheme with CPA security, and the output of PRF randomly hides the value of the bit b (assuming PRF is picked up from the pseudorandom function family).
We further show that A cannot obtain additional advantage in guessing the value of the bit b with the help of oracles O re and O dec . On one hand, if A submits a query ((ID * , w * ),
and C * 5 = C 5 , then the oracles will respond ⊥ as A cannot output a new and valid signature C 6 with respect to the same verification key C * 0 (assuming the underlying OTS scheme is strongly existential unforgeable). On the other hand, if C * 0 = C 0 , then the corresponding re-encryption and decryption will not help A in guessing the value of the bit b as the ciphertext is generated under a different 3-level identity vector I = (ID * , w * , C 0 ). From the challenge ciphertext, we can see that A can also submit a tuple ((ID * , w * ),
. If the challenger can verify whether the querying ciphertext is either an invalid one or a derivative of the challenge ciphertext, then A still cannot obtain any additional advantage in winning the game. This verification depends on the capability of the recovery of C * 2 . This is so because if C 2 is not derived from C * 2 (i.e. C * 2 cannot be deduced from C 2 ), and meanwhile C 2 = C * 2 , then it can be convinced that C 2 is mutated from C * 2 by A. In addition, the first λ 1 − λ bits of C * 1 can be used to verify the validity of C 2 as well. We present our formal security proof as follows.
Theorem 2. Suppose the decisional 3-wBDHI assumption holds, the underlying OTS scheme is strongly existential unforgeable (sUF) and PRF is a pseudorandom function family, our BiMH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure in the standard model.
Please refer to Appendix A for the proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Suppose our BiMH-IBCPRE scheme is IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure in the standard model, it also achieves collusion resistance in the standard model.
Remarks. In the IND-sCon-sID-CCA game defined in Definition 2, we can see that the adversary A can achieve a reencryption key from a challenge identity ID * i to a corrupted identity ID under w, where w is not the challenge condition.
Despite A can retrieve the partial re-encryption key prk w,i * = (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 , β 5 , β 6 ) from the above re-encryption key with knowledge of sk ID , it is still unable to recover the entire private key of identity ID * i as the random exponents ρ 1 , ρ 2 are unknown.
An efficient extension
In this section we extend our basic BiMH-IBCPRE scheme to support multiple conditions. In the multiple conditions setting, the proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext under ID A tagged with 
where r = r + t.
Enc(ID i , W , m). Same as that of the basic scheme except that C 4 = (h
and output the ciphertext
Re-Encryption Key Generation Protocol. (a) PReKeyGen(sk ID j , W ). ID j first generates sk (ID
and sends the partial re-encryption key , C (ID i ,W ) ). Same as that of the basic scheme except that Eq. (1) is modified as:
= e(g, C 5 ),
After re-encryption, the proxy outputs 
, and verify
From the above extension, it is interesting to see that the size of ciphertext and the number of bilinear pairings used in decryption is independent of the number of conditions. Thus, our extension does not incur a great deal of cost with respect to computation and communication. Similar to the basic scheme, the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security of the extended scheme can be proved in the standard model under the decisional (n + 2)-wBDHI assumption. The proof of the basic scheme presented in Appendix A can be easily adapted to that of the extension, we hence omit the details.
Comparison
In this section we compare our basic scheme with [7, 9, 14, 27] in terms of properties and efficiency. Table 2 shows the comparison of computation cost, and Table 3 shows the comparison of communication complexity. 
We first define the notations and parameters used in the tables. Let |G 1 | and |G T | denote the bit-length of an element in groups G 1 and G T , |svk| and |σ | denote the bit-length of the verification key and signature of OTS, |SKE| denote the bit-length of the ciphertext of a one-time symmetric key encryption, λ 1 denote the security parameter, t p , t e , t v , t s , t PRF , t SKE denote the computation cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation, one verification and one signature of an OTS scheme, a pseudorandom function and a one-time symmetric key encryption, respectively.
We now analyze the property comparison shown in Table 1 . Generally, our scheme with constant-size ciphertext is CCA secure in the standard model under the decisional 3-wBDHI assumption; meanwhile, it is the only scheme supporting conditional re-encryption. In addition, only [27] and our scheme achieve collusion resistance. Specifically, when compared with [14] (the scheme built in the random oracle model) which is only CPA secure under the decisional bilinear DiffieHellman (DBDH) assumption [33] , our scheme achieves stronger security and enjoys more properties. [9] is RCCA secure under the DBDH assumption but its ciphertext's size grows linearly in the number of re-encryption hops; nonetheless, our scheme is secure against CCA, and the size of ciphertext remains constant. Despite [7] (the scheme constructed in the standard model) is proved CCA secure under the modified DBDH (mDBDH) assumption [26] , it cannot support identitybased re-encryption and conditional re-encryption properties. Compared to [27] , our scheme enjoys additional properties, including conditional re-encryption and constant size ciphertext without losing CCA security. Moreover, [27] 7 requires that the underlying HIBE scheme must be fully CPA (i.e. IND-aID-CPA) secure. Nevertheless, our scheme is not limited to such a strong restriction but only requires the underlying HIBE scheme to be IND-sID-CPA secure. In conclusion, our scheme enables system users to implement more fine-grained delegation, and meanwhile, lessens the cost of storage for cloud server as well as the communication bandwidth without degrading security level. However, the problem of proposing a fully CCA-secure MH-IBCPRE in the standard model achieving all the properties of our scheme remains open. Without loss of fairness, we assume all the schemes listed in tables share the same number of re-encryption hops N, and for simplicity, we further set N = 1; meanwhile, the identity associated with ciphertext can be seen as public information in [9, 27] and our scheme. Note that in our scheme (ID i , w) is regarded as a single identity I . From Table 2 , we see that [14] is the most efficient scheme, while [27] suffers from the largest number of pairings. Compared with [7, 9] , our scheme increases 1t p and reduces 4t p in Dec (2nd level), respectively. Despite the overall performance of [14] is better than ours, our scheme needs no pairings in ReKey. Note that only [7] and our scheme require no pairings in ReKey. As opposed to [27] , our scheme significantly reduces the number of pairings in ReEnc and Dec. Thus, despite the performance of our scheme is not better than that of [14] which depends on random oracles, our scheme outperforms [27] which is the only MH-IBPRE with CCA security in the standard model; meanwhile, the cost of pairings in the decryption of our scheme is less than that of [9] . It is worth mentioning that the decryption cost of [9, 14, 27] is linear in N; on the contrary, ours remains constant. Table 3 generally shows that [14] has the smallest number of groups of elements for the ciphertexts and [7] only requires one group of element in ReKey, while [27] suffers from the largest number of groups of elements in each metric. Despite the overall communication cost of [14] is less than ours, our scheme reduces two elements in G T . When compared with [7] , one additional group of elements is needed in our ciphertext; in ReKey, we need 6 elements in G 1 , while [7] only requires one element in Z q . [9] enjoys less groups of elements in original ciphertext, but our scheme reduces 6 elements in G 1 and 1 element in G T , svk, σ , respectively, in terms of re-encrypted ciphertext. Besides, our re-encryption key only includes one group of elements when that of [9] requires 4. It is not difficult to see that our scheme outperforms [27] , especially in ReKey. 7 In [27] , Shao and Cao first proposed a generic construction for MH-IBPRE that requires an HIBE as primitive, and next presented a concrete scheme. In Table 2 , we compare our scheme with their concrete MH-IBPRE, which is secure against CCA under the decisional linear [34] and DBDH assumptions.
In conclusion, our scheme has better overall performance in communication when compared with [9, 27] ; meanwhile, it enjoys more properties than [7, 14] without significantly increasing the communication cost. Note our scheme will achieve better efficiency when N increases as our ciphertext size remains constant but [14, 9, 27] do not.
Applications of BiMH-IBCPRE
Groups data sharing. In a company, working groups of different departments might cooperate with each other so as to accelerate the process of some business project. For example, a project P 1 is assigned to group A, group B and group C simultaneously. Suppose the project data is stored in a cloud storage system. To enable each worker in the groups to share the data of P 1 without suffering from large decryption and encryption complexity, we can employ a BiMH-IBCPRE in the system.
The managers of Group A and group B can first generate a re-encryption key rk A→B|P 1 from A to B under a condition P 1. Likewise, the managers of group B and group C can generate another re-encryption key rk B→C |P 1 from B to C under P 1. The managers then upload the re-encryption keys to the cloud (i.e. the proxy). Due to the derivation property of re-encryption key, the proxy can deduce new re-encryption keys rk B→ A|P 1 and rk C →B|P 1 from the existing ones. With these re-encryption keys the proxy can transform the ciphertexts of the data to each group. For instance, by using rk A→B|P 1 the proxy can convert a ciphertext Enc (ID A , P 1, m 1 ) of a data m 1 , stored in the cloud by group A, to Enc(ID B , P 1, m 1 ) , which can be only decrypted by group B. Similarly, the ciphertexts encrypted under ID B and P 1 can be converted to the ones intended for group A.
Even if one of the groups, say group C , might simultaneously deal with another project, say P 2, the fine-grained control on re-encryption disallows group B (resp. A) to gain access to any data associated with a condition P 2. This is so because the re-encryption key tagged with a condition P 1 only allows the proxy to convert the ciphertexts associated with the same condition. Specifically, the re-encryption key rk B→C |P 1 and its derivation rk C →B|P 1 only allow the transformation of ciphertexts between B and C under project P 1.
Furthermore, since BiMH-IBCPRE supports multiple conditions, the working groups can make a more fine-grained control on data sharing. For example, group B and group C may choose to bidirectionally share their data tagged with a keyword set W = (" P 1", "stage 2", "meeting in company", "03/04/2012"). Here as long as the corresponding re-encryption key rk B→C |W (resp. rk C →B|W ) is given to the proxy, the ciphertexts of the data matching the keyword set can be converted between B and C .
Multi-devices data sharing. With popularization of cloud storage, many Internet users prefer to backup their data, which are stored in some personal portable devices (e.g., Ipad and mp3), to the cloud. How to efficiently and securely share the data among such devices becomes an interesting issue. Suppose an Internet user, say Alice, has three portable electronic devices, a PDA A 1 , an Ipad A 2 and a laptop A 3 . She might choose to share some data, e.g., a photo m tagged with a description S, among her devices by using the technology of BiMH-IBCPRE as follows.
Without loss of confidentiality, Alice prefers to encrypt the photo as Enc (ID A 1 , S, m) before uploading to the cloud via A 1 (i.e. Alice's PDA). Obtaining the fully control on her devices, Alice can generate the re-encryption keys rk A 1 →A 2 |S and rk A 2 →A 3 |S for the cloud server. The server, acting as a proxy, then re-encrypts the ciphertext of m under ID A 1 and S to Enc (ID A 2 , S, m) , which can be only decrypted in A 2 . Furthermore, the server can re-encrypt the resulting ciphertext to Enc (ID A 3 , S, m) . When accessing the photo from A 2 , Alice first logs in the device, and next decrypts Enc(ID A 2 , S, m) after downloading from the cloud. Similarly, Alice can read the photo in A 3 .
In this data sharing mechanism, even if one of the devices (e.g., A 1 ) is crashed down, the ciphertext of the photo stored in the cloud can still be accessed via the remaining devices, A 2 and A 3 . If the device A 1 is lost or stolen by an adversary, Alice can request the proxy to delete the corresponding re-encryption key related to A 1 , e.g., rk A 1 →A 2 |S and rk A 2 →A 1 |S , so as to prevent the unauthorized adversary from accessing the data of the remaining devices via A 1 . Although it might be possible for the adversary to obtain the re-encryption key rk A 1 →A 2 |S from the proxy by intrusion, the adversary cannot compromise the entire private key of A 2 due to the collusion resistance property. In addition, even in the worst case, that is, the adversary obtains rk A 1 →A 2 |S and further converts the ciphertexts of A 2 (stored in the cloud) to the ones which can be decrypted in A 1 , the system still guarantees that only the data associated with S other than all the data of A 2 will leak to the adversary.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed the first BiMH-IBPRE scheme that achieves conditional re-encryption with constant-size ciphertext. Moreover, we proved our scheme to be IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure and collusion resistant in the standard model. When compared with the existing MH-IBPRE schemes, our scheme achieves better performance in terms of communication complexity, and is able to provide fine-grained decryption rights delegation for system users.
This paper also motivates some interesting open problems, for example, how to construct a CCA-secure BiMH-IBCPRE system in the adaptive condition and adaptive identity model, i.e. achieving IND-aCon-aID-CCA security.
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose an adversary A can break the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security of our scheme. We then construct a reduction algorithm C 1 to solve the decisional 3-wBDHI * problem using A. Before proceeding, we first consider the sUF of the underlying one-time signature scheme. Suppose the challenge ciphertext is ((ID * , w * ), 2 be the case that A issues a re-encryption query ((ID * , w * ),
If one of the above cases occurs, we can construct an algorithm C 2 to break the sUF of the underlying onetime signature scheme. In the simulation C 1 will output a random bit and abort the simulation when either event 1 (ID i , w, K v , a 0i , a 1i , b 2i , b 3i , tag) , which are the private keys' information of uncorrupted or corrupted users, where 
and g A issues a query (ID i , ID j , w) (ID k , ⊥, ⊥, a 0k , a 1k , b 2k , b 3k , 1) ∈ SKT, or in a corrupted delegation chain under w.
ii. w * = w, ID i+ j−k is in an uncorrupted delegation chain, and ID k is either a corrupted identity, or in a corrupted delegation chain under w.
• If w * = w, ID * = ID i+ j−k , and ID k is either an uncorrupted identity or in an uncorrupted delegation chain under w, C 1 
3 ) as step (a), and adds the corresponding tuple to SKT. Else, C 1 derives sk (ID k 
If not, C 1 chooses a 0 * , a 1 * , b 3 * ∈ R G 1 and adds the corresponding tuple to SKT. Otherwise, C 1 constructs prk (w * ,k) as:
, and rk i+ j−k→k|w * as: • Else, C 1 transforms the ciphertexts under ID * , w * and K v to the ones which can be decrypted by A. Note these re-encryptions can be constructed as long as the ciphertexts taken as input are generated by A. 
and then adds the corresponding tuple to SKT, where r ID * ∈ R Z * q , I = (
If sk ID k is not in SKT, it will be constructed as step (a).
11 It is not difficult to verify the integrity of C 
and a 1 * = g r ID * · y , and finally recovers m as in the real scheme.
ii. , and finally recover m by using σ . Note that the private key is randomly chosen by C 1 .
-If (ID j , ID Otherwise, T ∈ R G T (i.e. the input tuple is sampled from R 3-wBDHI * ), the challenge ciphertext is independent of the bit b in the view of A. indicating T ∈ R G T ).
Remarks. In Phase 2, due to the capability of recovering C * 2 (which is based on knowledge of C Let Forge be the event that C 2 breaks the security of sUF-CMA of the underlying one-time signature scheme. When the input instance is sampled from P 3-wBDHI * (i.e. T = e(g, h) α 4 ), the view of A is identical to the real attacks, and A has 
